ICMM - International Council on Mining & Metals

CASE STUDY

Making changes to existing plans with respect to communities

Talc de Luzenac, a subsidiary of Rio Tinto, owns the Lassing talc operation through its wholly owned subsidiary Naintsch Mineralwerke (NMW). It is located in the Province of Steiermark, Austria. Lassing had an emergency procedures manual in accordance with corporate requirements, and a simulated rescue had been tested with assistance from the local emergency response teams.

This underground mine had been worked since 1901 and produced some 25,000 tonnes of talc per year. The operation was situated in a small valley midway between Vienna and Salzburg. Mining was carried out by the underhand cut-and-fill method. At about 10 am on Friday, 17 July 1998, a miner became trapped underground in a rest-room on an upper level following an inrush of water and mud. A crater began to appear on the surface, and houses in close proximity to this began to tilt and move. The entire mining work-force returned to site to assist in the rescue. Company officials came from Graz, the headquarters of Naintsch, and officers from provincial and federal mining authorities arrived from Vienna and Leoben.

By mid-afternoon, some 700 people overwhelmed the site – a number that grew over the next few days. The media, various authorities, fire brigade officers, local community members, police and general onlookers were all there. Some were local, others international. The friends and family of the trapped miner and the rescue miners were also present.

Local and Graz management, together with the officers of the mining authority and the rescue team, spent much of the afternoon and early evening underground, planning and effecting one of the rescue plans. Suddenly, at about 9:30 pm, the crater rapidly increased in size and filled with water. Those at the pithead felt a violent rush of air expelled from the shaft. At that point it was realized that a catastrophe had struck and that the nine miners and one technical expert who were still underground as part of the rescue effort were in terrible trouble.

After nine days of frenetic activity, the miner who was first trapped was rescued via a drill hole from the surface. This raised hopes that the others may also have survived and rescue attempts therefore continued until 14 August 1998. Various plans to reenter the mine to seek and recover the bodies were then worked on. In April 2000 these plans were finally put aside for safety reasons and planning for sealing the mine was commenced.

To put this tragedy in perspective, the nine Lassing miners comprised almost the entire mining work-force. Most lived in and around Lassing village and had relatives and family living within 5 kilometres of the site. Some close relatives also worked in the mill. One house was destroyed and two were so badly damaged that they had to be demolished. Some 12 families had to be relocated. The main local road and a local stream were diverted. This incident therefore deeply affected a very small and tightly knit community.

Investigation of the incident continued throughout 1999 and court action against the mine manager and several members of the Mining Authority took place during 2000. There was therefore almost continual media coverage and exposure of the accident for more than two years after its occurrence.

A tragedy of the scale that occurred at Lassing was a significant event for the country. In addition to the relatives, families, employees and the company management, who were directly affected, other parties or groups became involved. These included Rio Tinto and Luzenac, the media, politicians, the local community and a wide range of technical experts.

The government and NMW provided counselling and caring services, which included group therapy and one-on-one sessions for the relatives, group discussions with employees and psychiatric counselling for the mine manager and the surviving miner.

As with most newsworthy incidents, the media (press, radio and television) played a prominent part in, and had a substantial influence on, how things developed. The situation at Lassing possibly experienced greater exposure because of the large crater that formed (100 metres diameter and 40 metres deep), which, for reasons of investigation and approval by the authorities, was only filled in more than two years after the event. This constant reminder ensured that Lassing would never be far from public attention. It was noticeable that, until and throughout the trial, pictures of the crater usually accompanied news reports.

The media behaved in three different ways. Initially, due to lack of quality information, they were a vehicle to communicate what happened and to promote the recovery of the bodies. Then they became supporters of the relatives when it appeared that investigation, explanation and recovery were progressing slowly. Finally, the media were a voice for the defence at the trial when it appeared that the prosecution was disallowing presentation of some evidence. Their change in attitude as time progressed appeared to result from better management of the information flow. NMW eventually developed a strategy to supply as much information as requested, and in as simple a manner as possible, in contrast to some time after the incident, when there was no concerted, planned effort to keep the media in the picture.

Politicians and government departments at the local, provincial and federal levels were deeply involved. The main problem arising from the political involvement at Lassing was a lack of understanding. The mechanisms that led to the catastrophic inundation at Lassing were very complex, and a complete explanation for the tragedy has yet to be found. Yet the politicians understood that the families of the deceased miners wanted to recover their bodies, and they promised that this would happen on the false assumption that this was only a cost issue. Yet it was clear from around November 1998 that recovery of the bodies posed too great a safety risk and was not practicable. But it was not until April 2000 that a statement emerged from the Ministry that this was the case. By then the families and relatives were well aware that the bodies would not be recovered.

Lassing, a small community of about 500 families, was thrust into the limelight by the disaster. Because the community knew or understood very little about the situation, much misinformation circulated within it. Spurious accusations of waste material being dumped in the mine, illegal mining, management arrogance, major settlement of houses over the last 10 years, noise from blasting and so on were all raised. Initially, many, but not all, of those involved in the investigation felt that the technical issues were too complicated for the community and general public to grasp, hence they were excluded from the process. This problem was realized early in 1999, and the Mayor of Lassing was invited to join the weekly progress meetings held between the company, the Mining Authority and government departments. The Mayor thus came to understand that recovery would be difficult and dangerous. It was also noticeable from that moment that the relatives of the deceased no longer directed their frustration and anger at the company, as they had done immediately after the incident.

In handling the Lassing disaster, the management of NMW did many things right. They did have in place an emergency management plan and had tested it. Their care of the bereaved, those who had lost the property and their remaining employees was of a high order. However, nothing had prepared them either for the speed at which events escalated or for the scale of public and political reaction to the disaster. They were equally ill prepared for the intense and long-playing focus received from the Austrian media. Box 5 provides a summary of the critical lessons to be drawn from this sad event.

Following the disaster, Luzenac amended its comprehensive crisis management system to include additional scenarios reflecting these lessons. This led to a complete revision of emergency response/preparedness procedures at each of the group’s sites, including taking on board many of the APELL approaches. This was particularly because of APELL’s structured way of building up the connections with the local community and government at various levels.

Luzenac has consciously over many years worked to be a respected member of the local community. They have been very open with local groups and local authorities on their facilities and the potential risks that could affect them. They conduct open days and public meetings and provide their neighbours with printed and electronic information on their activities. The APELL approach seemed the natural way for Luzenac to proceed.

One example is the operations in the north of Italy. Here, there is an underground mine, various exhausted underground operations and a process plant on the banks of the River Chisone, at Porte, in Piedmont. Following the APELL process, Luzenac began consultations with local mayors and their administrations, explaining the company’s objectives. In conjunction with this the local emergency services – particularly fire and ambulance – were invited to make detailed inspections of the mine and plant. Together, the emergency preparedness and response arrangements were revised. They made many useful suggestions and provided some training services. Regarding the exhausted underground operations, all three parties have details of their locations and security, for the safety of local people and visitors.

Once the system was finalized and internal training was completed, a full mock emergency drill was carried out with the emergency services and in full communication with the local government authorities. Luzenac took the scenario of a major underground fire and invited local media to cover the practice drill. This was an effective means of communicating to the local population.

The event generated interest throughout the Piedmont region. As part of the preparations for the Winter Olympic Games in 2006, the organisers wanted to simulate a major emergency for the whole valley area and they invited Luzenac to be part of this exercise, due to its previous work. This set a good example to other industries in the area to improve their own emergency preparedness.

Luzenac has strengthened its position as a respected member of this community; the company has brought extra benefits to its customers by reducing business interruption risk and has raised the level of safety for employees. This is being replicated in all Luzenac sites worldwide.

Lassing’s Critical Lessons

• There is a vast difference between a real emergency and a simulation, particularly in the scale of public reaction, response and interest.
• The company should provide accurate and up-to-date information proactively and early. For this, a senior credible spokesperson must be appointed.
• All affected stakeholders should be included from an early stage in the information and dialogue processes.
• Simulating the chaos that develops during an emergency is as critical as simulating the technical aspects.
• Emergency plans need to be as strong in dealing with the media, community groups and government bodies as they are in dealing with rescue and recovery.
• The cultural context of an operation needs consideration within the emergency plan.